[*] Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. B.A., University of Michigan, 1962; J.D., University of Florida, 1964; L.L.M., University of Virginia, 1998. This Article is adapted from a thesis submitted by the author to partially fulfill the requirements of the degree of Master of Laws in the Judicial Process at the University of Virginia. Return to text.

[1] Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 361, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Return to text.

[2] *See* *id.*
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[3] *See* *id.* at 362.
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[4] *See* *id.*
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[5] *See* Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
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[6] *See* *id.*
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[7] *See* *infra* Part III.A.
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[8] *See* Gary D. Fox, *Objectionable Closing Argument: Causes and Solutions*, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 43; Bradley R. Johnson, *Closing Argument: Boom to the Skilled, Bust to the Overzealous*, FLA. B.J., May 1995, at 12; John W. Reis, *Improper Jury Argument: Guilding the Lustre of the Golden Rule*, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 60.
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[9] Hammond v. Mulligan, 667 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (Antoon, J., concurring). Return to text.

[10] Olbec v. Kraut, 650 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (Griffin, J., concurring). Return to text.

[11] *See* Edson R. Sunderland, *Improvement of Appellate Procedure*, 26 IOWA L. REV. 3, 9 (1940).
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[12] 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1982). Return to text.

[13] *Id.* at 457 n.1 (noting that requiring an objection "gives the adversary the opportunity either to avoid the challenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and it provides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of ordering a more fully developed record for review").
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[14] United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (footnote omitted). Return to text.

[15] *See* Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).

*Id.*
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[16] *See* Tyus v. Apalachicola N.R.R., 130 So. 2d 580, 587 (Fla. 1961).
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[17] *See* Newton v. South Fla. Baptist Hosp., 614 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
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[18] *See, e.g.*, Roundtree v. State, 362 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Fla. 1978).
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[19] *See* Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1985).
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[20] *See* *id.*
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[21] 468 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1985). Return to text.

[22] *See* *id.* at 909.
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[23] *See* *id.* at 910.
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[24] *See* *id.*
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[25] *See* *id.*
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[26] 479 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Return to text.

[27] *Id.* at 851.
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[28] *See* *id.* at 851 n.2.
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[29] 88 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1956). Return to text.

[30] *See* *Borden*, 479 So. 2d at 851.
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[31] *See* *Seaboard*, 88 So. 2d at 521.
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[32] *See* *id.* at 522 ("Giving his version of the accident in which the plaintiff was injured and while speaking of a demonstration of it staged during the trial at the place of its happening in the yards of the defendant Railroad, counsel in his argument to the jury in effect gave the following testimony . . . .").
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[33] *See* *id.* at 523.
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[34] Robinson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 214 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1954). As in *Seaboard*, some improper argument objections were made in *Robinson*; however, the lack of objections was not fatal to finding error. *See id.*
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[35] 124 Fla. 701, 169 So. 372 (1936). Return to text.

[36] *See* *Baggett*, 124 Fla. at 716, 169 So. at 379.
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[37] 86 Fla. 564, 98 So. 609 (1923). Return to text.

[38] *Baggett*, 124 Fla. at 717, 98 So. at 379.
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[39] *See* *Seaboard*, 88 So. 2d at 522-23.
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[40] 493 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (medical malpractice action). Return to text.

[41] *See* *id.* at 540.
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[42] 622 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (personal injury action). Return to text.

[43] *See* *id.* at 152.
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[44] 655 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (negligent hiring and retention of county employee). Return to text.

[45] *See* *id.* at 152.
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[46] 683 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (wrongful death action). Return to text.

[47] *See* *id.* at 555.
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[48] 647 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (claim for legal services rendered). Return to text.

[49] *See* *id.* at 296.
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[50] *See, e.g.*, Brafman v. Rybalka, 673 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial because the cumulative effect of the inflammatory remarks in the closing argument was fundamental error); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Morse, 653 So. 2d 409, 411-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (affirming the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial and stating that derogatory comments that attacked the integrity of opposing counsel constituted fundamental error); Bolufe v. Ramirez, 626 So. 2d 286, 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (finding that the trial court's grant of a new trial was proper because of the counsel's golden rule arguments in which counsel urged the jury to put themselves in the place of one of the parties); Kaas v. Atlas Chem. Co., 623 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (affirming the trial court's grant of a new trial because of an attorney's egregious comment that opposing counsel was a liar).
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[51] *See* S.H. Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Kincaid, 495 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (fraudulent misrepresentation).
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[52] *See* *id.*
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[53] *See* Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554, 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (personal injury action).
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[54] *See, e.g.*, Superior Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. Faulk, 695 So. 2d 376, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (products liability action); Hammond v. Mulligan, 667 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (Antoon, J., concurring) (personal injury action); Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (personal injury action); Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4, 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (personal injury action).
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[55] 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Return to text.

[56] A "conscience of the community" argument is impermissible in cases in which punitive damages are not being sought, where it can send a message to the jury that they are to punish the defendant. *See* Erie Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
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[57] *See* *Schubert*, 603 So. 2d at 555.
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[58] 640 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Return to text.

[60] *See, e.g., *Hammond v. Mulligan, 667 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (showing that the panel of judges was split concerning fundamental error with regard to closing argument); Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "[i]t is anomalous that the more objectionable the comment, the less the incentive to object"); Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (Sharp, J., dissenting) (stating that "improper comments by trial counsel, which are unobjected to at trial, only constitute reversible error if they are so outrageous they impaired the jury's calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and resulted in an unfair trial").
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[61] *See* Blue Grass Shows, Inc. v. Collins, 614 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that the "conscience of the community argument" was not sufficiently egregious to be fundamental error).
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[62] *See* Pippin v. Latosynski, 622 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
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[63] *See* Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (reversing and remanding for new trial because of egregious personal opinions and reference to matters outside the evidence); Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (reversing and remanding for new trial because counsel expressed his personal opinion during closing argument and suggested that the plaintiff's claim was fraudulent); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Stone, 650 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reversing in part and remanding for a new trial because counsel referred to a matter outside of the record that was not included as evidence and expressed personal opinions as to the merits of the case).
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[64] *See* Hagan v. Sun Bank, 666 So. 2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
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[65] 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Although the author sits on the Fourth District Court of Appeal, he did not participate in the *Norman* decision.
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[66] 368 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Return to text.

[67] *See* *id.* at 362.
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[68] LeRetilley v. Harris, 354 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Return to text.

[69] *See* *Norman*, 668 So. 2d at 1018.
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[70] *See id.*
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[71] *See* *id.* at 1020.
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[72] *See* *id.*
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[73] *Id.* at 1021-23.
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[74] *Id.* at 1020.
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[75] 354 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Return to text.

[76] *See Norman*, 668 So. 2d at 1024.
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[77] *See* *id.* at 1025 (Farmer, J., dissenting); *see also* *id.* at 1033 (Stevenson, J., dissenting).
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[78] *See* *id.* at 1024-25.
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[79] *See* *id.* at 1024 (Stone, J., concurring specially with opinion in which Dell, J., concurs) (Stevenson, J., dissenting with opinion in which Shahood, J., concurs).
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[80] *See* *id.* at 1018 (reversing because of improper unobjected-to argument and improper contact between a juror and an employee of the defendant).
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[81] *See, e.g.,* Murphy v. International Robotics Sys., Inc., 710 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), *rev. granted,* No. 92,837, 1998 Fla. LEXIS 1617, at *1 (Fla. Aug. 7, 1998) (stating that "a party who does not object to counsel's comments in closing should not be allowed to complain of those comments on appeal"); Rutherford v. Lyzak, 698 So. 2d 1305, 1306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (stating that even where there is improper argument an objection must be made); Weise v. REPA Film Int'l, 683 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (emphasizing that a new trial should be requested at the time of objection); Donohue v. FPA Corp., 677 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (stating that no fundamental error occurred when defense counsel implied that a video introduced by the plaintiff was doctored).
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[82] 692 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that an attorney's communication of his personal opinion in closing argument is not always fundamental error). Return to text.

[83] *See* R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e).
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[84] 650 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (personal injury action). Return to text.

[85] *See* *id.* at 679-80 (holding that the combined effect of unethical remarks pervading the entire trial was fundamental error but unobjected-to unethical remarks were not per se fundamental error).
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[86] *See* *Winterberg*, 692 So. 2d at 255.
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[87] *See* *id.* (citing the concurring opinion in *Rockman v. Barnes*, 672 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), which suggested that *Sacred Heart Hospital *was different because the conduct was "so egregious as to affect the fairness of those proceedings").
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[88] *See* *supra* notes 64-81 and accompanying text. Appellate courts in Florida are not required to write opinions. Statistics furnished by the five district courts of appeal for 1996 reflect that, on the average, about 40% of all final appeals are affirmed without opinion. Accordingly, there are likely more appeals produced by unobjected-to error in closing argument than the opinions cited in this Article.
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[89] *See, e.g.*, Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
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[90] *See* Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So. 2d 825, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
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[91] *See, e.g.*, Eichelkraut v. Kash N' Karry Food Stores, 644 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that the closing argument at trial did not deny the defendant a fair trial); Gregory v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 484 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (disagreeing with the trial court's conclusion that the closing argument was fundamental error).
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[92] *See* Hagan v. Sun Bank, 666 So. 2d 580, 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (personal injury action).
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[93] *See, e.g.*, Goutis v. Express Transp., Inc., 699 So. 2d 757, 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (finding that an attorney's questions and comments were not golden rule arguments or improper personal opinions); Rutherford v. Lyzak, 698 So. 2d 1305, 1306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (stating that an objection must be made even where there is improper argument).
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[94] *See* FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(a)(4).
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[95] 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970). Return to text.

[96] *Id.* at 137 (citing State v. Heisler, 272 P.2d 660, 670 (N.M. 1954); Holman v. State, 262 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Okla. 1953); Goodhue v. Fuller, 193 S.W. 170, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)).
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[97] *See* Rubin v. Sanford, 218 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA), *quashed by* 237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970).
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[98] *See* *Sanford*, 237 So. 2d at 138.
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[99] *See* Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Strickland, 88 So. 2d 514, 523 (Fla. 1956).
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[100] *See* *Sanford*, 237 So. 2d at 137.
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[101] 130 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1961). Return to text.

[102] *See* *id.* at 587 (noting that the First District Court of Appeal stated that the improper remarks made by counsel deserved timely objection).
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[103] *See* Apalachicola N.R.R. v. Tyus, 114 So. 2d 33, 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959).
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[104] Tyus v. Apalachicola N.R.R., 130 So. 2d 580, 587 (Fla. 1961). Return to text.

[105] *See* *id.* at 591-93 (O'Connell, J., dissenting).
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[106] *See* *id.* at 591-92.
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[107] *Id.* at 592.
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[108] *See* *id.*
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[109] *Id.*
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[110] *Id.* at 593.
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[111] *Id.* at 588.
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[112] *See* *id.*
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[113] 630 So. 2d. 1080 (Fla. 1994) (appealing the death penalty). Return to text.

[114] *Id.* at 1084 (quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993)).
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[115] *See* *id.* at 1083-84.
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[116] 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981). Return to text.

[117] *Id.* at 960 (citing Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)).
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[118] *See* *id.* at 959.
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[119] *See* *id.* at 958.
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[120] *Id.* at 960.
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[121] *See* *supra* Part III.B.
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[122] OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, *reprinted in* THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (Legal Classics Library 1982) (1881).
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[123] *See* Garren v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988) (stating that the prosecutor made several remarks which were so egregious that mistrial was the only remedy and that violations of the golden rule are clearly prohibited); Goutis v. Express Transp., Inc., 699 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (stating that golden rule arguments are impermissible because they encourage jurors to decide cases on personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence).
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[124] *See* Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d 74, 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).
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[125] *See* Miku v. Olmen, 193 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).
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[126] *See* Cleveland Clinic Fla. v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that a golden rule argument is subject to the harmless error doctrine because a golden rule argument may not result in a miscarriage of justice).
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[127] 693 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Return to text.

[128] 685 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Return to text.

[129] *See* *Grushoff,* 693 So. 2d at 1069 (citing Cleveland Clinic Fla. v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (Farmer, J., concurring)).
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[130] *See* Tremblay v. Santa Rosa County, 688 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
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[131] *See* Kaas v. Atlas Chem. Co., 623 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
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[132] *See* Forman v. Wallshein, 671 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
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[133] *See* Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Bass v. State, 547 So. 2d 680, 682-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Redish v. State, 525 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
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[134] R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e). Return to text.

[135] *Compare* *Forman*, 671 So. 2d at 874-75 (noting that the use of "I think" or "I believe" is often a figure of speech) *with* Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 257-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (objecting to a lawyer's use of "I think" in closing argument).
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[136] *See* *Forman*, 671 So. 2d at 874-75.
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[137] *See* *Muhammad*, 668 So. 2d at 257-58 (holding that comments by retailer's counsel in closing argument violated the rule of professional conduct prohibiting an attorney at trial from offering personal opinion as to justness of a cause or credibility of witnesses).
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[138] 671 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Return to text.

[139] *See* Goutis v. Express Transp., Inc., 699 So. 2d 757, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (discussing a number of different comments that prompted the trial court to grant a new trial).
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[140] *See* *id.* at 760-65.
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[141] *Id.* at 765.
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[142] *See* John J. Parker, *Improving Appellate Methods*, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1950).
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[143] *See* Tyus v. Apalachicola N.R.R., 130 So. 2d 580, 588 (Fla. 1961).
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[144] Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1975) (quoting Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. 1959)). Return to text.

[145] *See* *id.* at 522.
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[146] *See* *id.* at 524 (Overton, J., concurring).
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[147] *See* *id.* at 523.
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[148] *See* Robert J. Martineau, *Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule*, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1057-58 (1987).
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[149] *See* *id.* at 1061.
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[150] *Id.*
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[151] *See* *id.* at 1059.
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[152] *Id.*
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[153] *Id.* at 1060.
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[154] *See* *id.*
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[155] *See* *id.*
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[156] *See* Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, *Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal*, 63 IND. L.J. 985, 1010 (1989) (advocating a uniform system for hearing issues on appeal when the issues are not raised at the trial level).
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[157] *See* *id.* at 1011.
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[158] *See* Martineau, *supra* note 148, at 1058.
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[159] 322 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1974). Return to text.

[160] *Id.* at 116-17 (footnote omitted).
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[161] *See id.*
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[162] Martineau, *supra* note 148, at 1033.
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[163] Federal Rule of Evidence 103, which provides for objections to evidence and the proffering of it, does not preclude courts from applying plain error. *See* FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
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[164] United States v. Caputo, 978 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1992). Return to text.

[165] Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has found plain error in other cases as well. *See, e.g.*, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (finding error in an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to the jury); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1986) (finding unlawful the exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant's race); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 43 (1984) (dealing with error in the right to a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 186-87 (1984) (dealing with error in the right to self-representation at trial).
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[166] *See* Mark Hansen, *If the Claim Doesn't Fit*, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 18 (illustrating the increasing number of argument abuses and the unwillingness of judges to tolerate improper argument).
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[167] *See* Hall v. Freese, 735 F.2d 956, 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving physical injury and economic damages of $500,000).
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[168] *See* Rojas v. Richardson, 713 F.2d 116, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1983).
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[169] *See id.*
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[170] *See* Griego v. Conwell, 222 P.2d 606, 609 (N.M. 1950).
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[171] *See* Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114, 117 (Pa. 1974).
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[172] *See* Lopez v. Southwest Community Health Serv., 833 P.2d 1183, 1185 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
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[173] *See* Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 421, 428 (Mo. 1958).
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[174] *See, e.g.*, Long v. Twehous Contractors, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the lower court's decision even though the plaintiff made no objection to a possibly prejudicial argument); Hammer v. Waterhouse, 895 S.W.2d 95, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an argument is not preserved for review when counsel fails to object to inappropriate comments).
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[175] R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-4.3(e); *accord* Bellsouth Human Resources Admin. v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (stating that "[t]he remarks of both counsel are in direct violation of [Rule] 4-3.4(e)"); Pippin v. Latosynski, 622 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (stating that "[c]ounsel's expression of personal outrage amounts to a personal opinion clearly in breach of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Rule 4-3.4(e)"); Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4, 5-6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding that a lawyer's comments violated Rule 4-3.4(e) as improper argument).
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[176] 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Return to text.

[177] *See* *id.* at 584.
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[178] 619 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Return to text.

[179] *Id.* at 4.
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[180] *See* *id.* at 5 (citing Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
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[181] *See* *supra* notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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[182] 668 So. 2d 1016, 1023-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Return to text.

[183] *See, e.g.,* Goutis v. Express Transp., Inc., 699 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Hagan v. Sun Bank, 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
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[184] *See* Fox, *supra* note 8, at 43; Johnson, *supra* note 8, at 12; Reis, *supra* note 8, at 60. All three articles point out that the lawyers are not getting the message regarding improper argument.
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[185] *See* Fox, *supra* note 8, at 46-47.
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[186] *See* *id.* at 48.
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[187] Bellsouth Human Resources Admin. v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Return to text.

[188] *See* Marc Garamter, *Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents*, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 474 (1998).
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[189] *See* Richard M. Birnholz, *The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls*, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 979-82 (1990) (exploring the contingency fee and the propriety of capping the fee).
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[190] 572 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Return to text.

[191] *See id.* at 944-45.
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[192] *See* *id.* at 944.
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[193] *See* *id.* at 945.
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[194] *See* *id.*
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[195] 666 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Return to text.

[196] *See* *id.* at 1046.
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[197] *See* *id.* at 1047.
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[198] *See* Sanchez v. Sanchez, 435 So. 2d 347, 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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[199] *See* Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
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[200] *See* Richard W. Painter, *Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?*, 71 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 625, 668 (1995) (illustrating the conflict of interest attorneys confront when they bill on a contingent fee basis).
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[201] *See* R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e).
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[202] R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-3.5(a). Return to text.

[203] *See* The Florida Bar v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. 1996) (public reprimand); The Florida Bar v. Schaub, 618 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1993) (suspension from the practice of law).
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[204] *See* The Florida Bar v. Newhouse, 498 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 1986) (reprimanding an attorney for contacting jury members after an adverse verdict to find out why the jury found against his client).
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[205] *See* Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, 850-51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Donohue v. FPA Corp., 677 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (Klein, J., concurring); Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777, 778-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
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[206] *See* *Borden*, 479 So. 2d at 851 n.2.
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[207] *In re* Florida Supreme Court Comm'n on Professionalism, Fla. Admin. Order (Fla. July 19, 1996) (on file with Clerk, Sup. Ct. of Fla.).
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[208] Letter from Daniel T.K. Hurley, Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, to Larry A. Klein, Judge, District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Aug. 10, 1996) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Letter]. Return to text.

[209] *See* *id.*
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[210] 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Return to text.

[211] Letter, *supra* note 208.
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[212] *See* State v. Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984).
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[213] *See* FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3D(2).
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[214] *See* *Bellsouth*, 641 So. 2d at 429.
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[215] *See* *id.*
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[216] *Id.* at 428.
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[217] Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 361, 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Return to text.

[218] *Id.* at 361-62.
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[219] Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, 852 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Return to text.

[220] *See* D'Auria v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 147, 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (Antoon, J., concurring).
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[221] Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Return to text.

[222] *Id.* at 1024.
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[223] *See* Tyus v. Apalachicola N.R.R, 130 So. 2d 580, 586 (Fla. 1961).
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[224] *See* Hagan v. Sun Bank, 666 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
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[225] *See* *id.*
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[226] *See* *id.* at 582, 585-86 (citing *Tyus*, 130 So. 2d at 587); Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 98 So. 609 (1923)).
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[227] *Hagan*, 666 So. 2d at 586.
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[228] *Id.*
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[229] *See* *id.*
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[230] *See* *id.*
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[231] Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Return to text.

[232] *Hagan*, 666 So. 2d at 586.
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[233] *See* Reynolds v. State, 580 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
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[234] *See* *id.*
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[235] 652 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1995). Return to text.

[236] *See* Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 1995).
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[237] *Id.*
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[238] *See* *id.* at 355-56.
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[239] Hagan v. Sun Bank, 666 So. 2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Return to text.

[240] *See* Royal Indem. Co. v. Muscato, 305 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (limiting a new trial in a personal injury action to the question of liability). The plaintiff in *Royal* *Indemnity Co. *was injured while sitting on a parade float. *See* *id.* at 228. Although the defendant's attorney objected to the plaintiff attorney's repeated questions about whether the float driver received a traffic citation after the accident, the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard what they heard. *See* *id.* at 229*.* The Fourth District reversed because "[t]he trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard the allusions to the traffic citation could not possibly erase the effect of the prejudicial question from the mind of the jury in their consideration of liability." *Id.*
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[241] O'Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting the trial judge). Return to text.

[242] *See* Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., 553 So. 2d 787, 791-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (reversing and remanding because, through questioning, defendant's counsel suggested that his client had not been cited for a traffic violation); *Royal Indem. Co.*, 305 So. 2d at 229.
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[243] *See* *Royal Indem. Co.*, 305 So. 2d at 229.
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[244] *See, e.g.*, Henry v. Beacon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 424 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that a mistrial should have been granted after counsel disclosed a prior settlement).
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[245] *See e.g.*, Parry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 407 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (stating that the failure to object was a waiver as to irrelevant evidence that the insured had previously made a fraudulent insurance claim); Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (stating that the failure to object was a waiver as to irrelevant evidence of the insured's drug violations in his fire insurance claim).
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[246] Martineau, *supra* note 148, at 1030.
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[247] *See* Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 571, 98 So. 609, 612 (1923).
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[248] *See* *supra* notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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[249] *See* Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1985).
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[250] *See* *id.*
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[251] *See* LEARNED HAND, *A Personal Confession*, *in* THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960) (1958).
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[252] Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1959) (Overton, J., concurring) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)). Return to text.

[253] Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133-34 (Fla. 1985). Return to text.